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1605 
THE BILLION DOLLAR INDUSTRY THAT HAS NEVER PAID ITS 
MONEY-MAKERS: THE NCAA’S ATTEMPT AT COMPENSATION 




The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) has 
regulated collegiate sports for over one hundred years. The NCAA 
has long relied upon the principle of amateurism to prohibit college 
athletes from profiting from their name, image and likeness (“NILs”). 
However, recently this principle has drawn a lot of attention and has 
all but crumbled. States across the nation have passed legislation that 
will soon come into effect to bypass the NCAA bylaws and allow 
student athletes to profit from their NILs, even the United States 
Supreme Court has called the NCAA’s business model into question. 
This has left the NCAA with no choice but to pivot and allow athletes 
to profit from their NILs for the first time. This Note will explore the 
NCAA’s history of exploiting student-athletes for profit, and how 
their attitude towards the concept of NILs has changed overtime. This 
Note begins by looking at the NCAA’s business model and how they 
have turned themselves into a billion-dollar business that does not 
pay their money-makers, the athletes. Prior to addressing the various 
state legislations and federal proposals, this Note will also recount 
prior Supreme Court cases. Ultimately, this Note will propose 
standardized federal legislation to govern NIL laws.  
 
 
* Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D.  Candidate Class of 2022; 
Pennsylvania State University, B.A. in Criminology with a minor in History, 2019.  
I would like to thank my Notes Editors, Katherine Carroll and Hayley Valla, for all 
of their help during this process, as well as my faculty advisor Dean Citron for 
guiding me through the publication process.  Lastly, a huge thank you to my 
parents, brother and sister for listening to me talk nonstop about this for two years 
and for all of their support.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
California recently became the first state in the nation to allow 
compensation to the workhorses of a billion-dollar industry: college 
athletics.  The state recently passed a bill that will allow college 
athletes to profit from their Names, Image and Likeness (NILs).1  
This change has caused the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) to reconsider its stance on NILs.  California’s statute allows 
athletes to be compensated for their popularity and has inspired 
Congress and other states to contemplate and propose similar 
legislation.2  The NCAA can no longer ignore the fact that the multi-
billion-dollar industry it created, and continues to regulate, needs to 
compensate its money-makers, the athletes.  
While historically the players have remained uncompensated, 
athletic programs at universities and colleges have been raking in 
money hand over fist through apparel deals, ticket sales, and various 
non-monetary benefits.  All the while, every Division 13 football and 
basketball program has exclusive deals with either Adidas, Nike or 
Under Armour.4  These apparel deals are incredibly lucrative 
marketing opportunities that allow the respective companies to reach 
a massive national audience. 
 
1 Jack Kelly, Newly Passed California Fair Pay to Play Act Will Allow Student 
Athletes To Receive Compensation, FORBES (Oct. 1, 2019, 12:36 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2019/10/01/in-a-revolutionary-change-
newly-passed-california-fair-pay-to-play-act-will-allow-student-athletes-to-receive-
compensation/?sh=2d70c02457d0.   
2 Nicole Berkowitz et al., More States Draft Legislation To Address Student Athlete 
Compensation As The NCAA Passes The Ball To Congress, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 5, 
2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5701fc57-8d88-46bc-9569-
43f5b3ca6a5e. 
3 See The Difference in the College Division Levels, NEXT COLL. STUDENT 
ATHLETE, https://www.ncsasports.org/recruiting/how-to-get-recruited/college-
divisions (last visited Mar. 13, 2021) (describing what Division I sports have to 
offer: “DI offers a higher level of competition and is home to some of the largest 
and most prestigious schools in the country.” Id. Further when describing what 
Division I sports are like for the athletes “You will be tired. Internships, spring 
break getaways, even part-time jobs are pretty much out of the question.  The DI 
athlete is truly dedicated to their sport for the next four years.” Id.). 
4 SI Wire, How Adidas, Nike and Under Armour Have Divvied Up Major College 




Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [2021], Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss3/15
2021 COMPENSATION THROUGH NIL 1607 
Since its inception, the NCAA has proclaimed that its true 
interests include educating student-athletes and attempting to separate 
collegiate and professional sports.  However, this attempted 
separation is nothing more than a half-hearted attempt to keep the 
commercial nature of college sports behind closed doors.  Apparel 
deals, ticket sales, and school reputations have made it so that some 
college games have over one billion dollars at play when student-
athletes gear up.5  Despite this, the NCAA still prevented all college 
athletes from making a single cent from their own popularity without 
facing serious repercussions.6  Today, tensions surrounding this topic 
are high.7  A current class action lawsuit, in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California, alleges that the NCAA 
is violating antitrust regulations.8  The plaintiffs argue that it is unjust 
for the universities, apparel companies, and many others to profit 
from the hard work of these athletes without allowing them to earn 
money for themselves.9  Furthermore, states across the nation have 
pushed the issue by adopting various legislation that will allow these 
athletes to profit on their NILs.10  All of this pressure has resulted in 
 
5 See Kate Gibson, Nike’s high-profile shoe fail costs $1.1 billion in stock value, 
CBS NEWS (Feb. 21, 2019, 4:23 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nike-stock-
drop-zion-williamson-shoe-incident-and-injury-costs-1-1-billion-in-stock-value.  
(Of importance, Nike lost over one billion dollars in stock value after a star player 
was injured wearing their sneakers). 
6 See N.C.A.A. Const. art. XII, § 12.5.2.1 (effective Aug. 1, 2020); N.C.A.A. 
Const. art. XII, § 12.5.2.2 (effective Aug. 1, 2020). 
7 See generally Steve Berkowitz, New name, image, likeness lawsuit against NCAA 
could put hundreds of millions of dollars at stake, USA TODAY (Jun. 15, 2020, 
11:08 A.M.), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2020/06/15/ncaa-
lawsuit-over-athletes-images-likeness-puts-big-money-stake/3189283001. The 
article speaks about a new filing against the Power Five and NCAA over NIL 
control and compensation, it also speaks about the increasing tensions on this issue 
due to a recent judgement rendered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which 
“unanimously upheld a district court ruling that the NCAA had violated antitrust 
law with its limits on various benefits athletes can receive from their schools.” Id.  
8 House et al. v. National Collegiate Athletic Association et al., 4:20-cv-0319, June 
15, 2020. 
9 Id. 
10 Dave Eminian, How will the NCAA’s new NIL rules affect the Missouri Valley 
Conference. What we know, JOURNAL STAR (July 4, 2021, 5:20 AM), 
https://www.pjstar.com/story/sports/college/basketball/bradley-
hoops/2021/07/04/ncaa-nil-rules-how-they-affect-missouri-valley-
conference/7845665002 (discussing all the states that have adopted NIL 
legislation). 
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the momentous decision by the NCAA to adopt an interim NIL 
policy.11  This policy allows for student athletes to monetarily 
capitalize from his or her NILs without violating any NCAA bylaw. 
12  This Note will argue that there will need to be federal action to 
override the NCAA’s interim NIL policy without violating any 
NCAA bylaw.  Federal legislation is the only way to protect the 
sanctity of college athletics, while also preventing the NCAA from 
continuously being unjustly enriched.  
Section II of this Note will focus on the athletes that the 
NCAA regulates and delve into the commercial nature of college 
sports.  After setting the background, Section III will discuss the 
attempts to change NILs through the courts and the proposed 
solutions, in addition to the NCAA’s evolving stance on NILs.  
Section IV will examine the state statutes that have been proposed 
across the country and the impact they can have on college sports.  
Section V will address and juxtapose the NCAA’s original proposal 
and the interim policy it recently adopted.  Finally, section VI will 
investigate the existing congressional proposals and offer a solution 
to address the uniform standard for regulating NILs. 
II. THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE NCAA AND 
COLLEGE ATHLETES 
A. The Athletes 
The NCAA regulates over 480,000 athletes at the collegiate 
level.13  Of those athletes, 18,816 play Division I men’s basketball 
and 73,712 play Division I football.14  This is an important distinction 
because it is reported that across all markets, the athletes in those 
sports bring in a total of $14 billion in annual revenue.15  Out of all of 
 
11 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA adopts interim name, image and likeness policy, 
NCAA (June 30, 2021, 4:20 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/news/ncaa-adopts-interim-name-image-and-likeness-policy.  
12 Id. 
13 Estimated Probability of Competing In College Athletics, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-
college-athletics (Apr. 8, 2020). 
14 Id.  
15 Tom Huddleston Jr., College Football Stars Could Be Earning As Much As $2.4 
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those players, only 1.2% of those men’s basketball players, and 1.6% 
of those football players make the step to the professional level.16  
Thus, for the overwhelming majority of college athletes, the biggest 
stage they will play on is at the intercollegiate level.  Consequently, 
the typical student-athletes’ popularity peaks during their years in 
college, and so does their ability to monetarily capitalize on it.  
However, prior to adoption of the interim NIL policy, 17 any attempt 
to do so would be a direct violation of NCAA bylaws 12.5.2.118 and 
12.5.2.2.19   
Section 12.5.2.1 of the NCAA bylaws prohibited an athlete 
from being eligible to play in college sports if, at any time, the athlete 
was compensated for the use of his NILs in advertising, or for 
promoting the sale of any commercial product.20  An athlete would 
also be ineligible to participate in athletics if the NCAA learned that 
the athlete received any money from endorsing products through 
individual use.21  Whereas section 12.5.2.1 was a limitation on the 
athlete’s ability to monetize his NILs,22 section 12.5.2.2 prohibited 
another’s use of an athlete’s NILs, but only punished the athlete if it 
was violated.23  More specifically, if an athlete’s “name or picture 
appears on commercial items or is used to promote a commercial 
product sold by an individual or agency without the student-athlete’s 
knowledge or permission” that athlete must proactively take steps to 
stop it.24  Failure to do so could have resulted in players losing their 
eligibility to play in collegiate athletics.25  This meant that even if the 
athletes were not aware their NILs were being used to generate 
revenue, the NCAA was still at liberty to revoke their amateur status 
and consequently their ability to play collegiate sports.26  These 
limitations on college athletes’ ability to monetize their NILs was a 
 
16 Estimated Probability of Competing In College Athletics, supra note 12. 
17 Hosick, supra note 11. 
18 N.C.A.A. Const. art. XII, § 12.5.2.1 (effective Aug. 1, 2020).  
19 N.C.A.A. Const. art. XII, § 12.5.2.2 (effective Aug. 1, 2020). 
20 N.C.A.A. Const. art. XII, § 12.5.2.1 (effective Aug. 1, 2020). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 N.C.A.A. Const. art. XII, § 12.5.2.2 (effective Aug. 1, 2020). 
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limitation exclusively imposed upon college athletes.27  All other 
college students, from college musicians to student journalists to 
students not involved in extracurriculars students, had the ability to 
profit from their NILs.28 
B. What Are NILs and How Are They Used? 
The NCAA defines the term “Names, Image and Likeness” as 
“the three elements that make up the legal concept known as ‘right of 
publicity.’”29  This involves situations where “permission is required 
of a person to use their name, image or likeness.  For example, no 
permission is required for a newspaper to publish a photo of an 
athlete playing in a game because the legal copyright would belong to 
the photographer, not the person pictured.”30  More generally, the 
term and concept of “names, image and likeness” encapsulate an 
athlete’s ability to “sell [his or her]NILs to entities for a host of 
activities other than in-game broadcasts: including endorsements, 
advertisements, items of clothing, appearing at clinics, appearing in 
video games, or commercializing an athlete’s social media site.”31  
Although athletes have been prohibited from using their own 
NILs to make a profit, that did not stop universities and the NCAA 
from doing just that.32  They do so in a variety of ways.  Similar to 
many modern companies today, conferences, schools, and the NCAA 
itself use social media as a promotional tool.33  They also use the 
athletes to participate in social media blitzes, a marketing strategy 
 
27 Peter Colin, What’s in a Name? The Battle Over Name, Image & Likeness Rights 




29 Rachel Stark-Mason, What Name, Image and Likeness Means for College Sports. 
and how the NCAA is Turning to Student-Athletes to Navigate a Path Forward, 
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/champion/name-image-likeness (The NCAAA took 
down the page after adopting their interim NIL policy) (last visited Sept. 18, 2020). 
30 Id. 
31 Jayma Meyer & Andrew Zumbalist, A Win Win: College Athletes get paid for 
their Names, Image and Likeness and Colleges Maintain the Primacy of 
Academics, 11 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT L. 247, 286 (Spring 2020) (discussing what 
NILs encompass). 
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designed to promote a product or brand, that garners commercial 
benefits for the NCAA and its members.34  Moreover, college 
coaches may also reap the financial rewards of their teams’ 
popularity through the online economy of social media.35  However, 
the commercial benefits do not stop with social media opportunities 
and e-commerce.36  In fact, the class action complaint filing of House 
et al. v. NCAA explains how elite college athletes are exploited for 
the profitable gain of others.37  While football and basketball bring in 
the majority of revenue for the NCAA, the inability to profit from 
NILs had a harsher impact on athletes who participated in small 
market sports, such as gymnastics.38 
Katelyn Ohashi was a gymnast for the UCLA Bruins.39  
During her senior year, in 2019, Ms. Ohashi’s top-scoring floor 
routine “went viral[,] making her one of the most famous college 
gymnasts ever.  But NCAA rules prevented Ohashi from making any 
money from the performance.”40  Ms. Ohashi was featured in an op-
ed video, published by the New York Times, arguing for college 
athletes to be able to monetize their achievements.41  She explained 
 
34 Id. 
35 The cyber economy encapsulates different aspects of using the internet to create 
revenue. Such as when:  
 
The NCAA, conferences, and schools (…) promote themselves 
and their athletic programs via social media such as Instagram 
and Twitter, and have their athletes participate in social media 
blitzes for the commercial benefit of the NCAA and its members. 
Coaches and others associated with college athletic programs also 
reap the financial rewards of payments from social media 
companies and other lucrative aspects of the online economy. 
Yet, the NCAA’s draconian NIL restrictions prevent student-
athletes from commercially benefitting from their postings on 
social media, despite the fact that other college students are able 
to commercially benefit from social media opportunities and 
many do.  
Id.  
36 See generally House et al., 4:20-cv-0319, June 15, 2020 (referencing the many 
ways that social media is used to generate money for college athletic programs). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 4. 
40 Katelyn Ohashi, Everyone Made Money Off My N.C.A.A. Career, Except Me, 
N.Y TIMES (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/opinion/katelyn-
ohashi-fair-play-act.html.  
41 House et al., 4:20-cv-0319, June 15, 2020 at 4. 
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how both UCLA, the school she attended, and the NCAA were able 
to profit from the 100 million views on her routine, yet she was not 
able to earn a single dollar from this social media popularity.42  Ms. 
Ohashi’s NIL value post-graduation, simply due to the sport that she 
plays, will quickly diminish as there is not any viable professional 
sports option in gymnastics.43  Those who play similar sports are not 
left with lucrative options post-college, and even in sports that do 
have a professional level, the chance of reaching it is slim at best.44  
This is just one story of many other athletes whose NILs have been 
exploited for the profit of others without any compensation to the 
athletes themselves. 
C. The Line Between College and Professional Sports 
Under the section titled “Commitment to the Division I 
Collegiate Model” of the NCAA Division I manual is a subsection 
titled “The Commitment to Amateurism.”45  This subsection outlines 
the NCAA’s attempt to separate collegiate and professional sports.46  
It provides that all Division I members of the NCAA must run their 
athletics programs in accordance with the NCAA bylaws.47  It further 
adds that students “choose to participate in intercollegiate athletics as 
a part of their educational experience thus maintaining a line of 
demarcation between student athletes who participate in Collegiate 
Model and athletes competing in the professional model.”48   
The NCAA bolsters the division between professional and 
collegiate athletics by requiring all prospective student-athletes in 
Division I and II schools to register with the NCAA as amateur 
athletes prior to competing.49  Once registered as amateur athletes, 
the athletes become subject to specific stipulations in order to retain 
 
42 Ohashi, supra note 39.  
43 House et al., 4:20-cv-0319, June 15, 2020 at 4. 
44 Estimated Probability Of Competing In Professional Athletics, NCAA, 
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-
professional-athletics, (Apr. 8, 2020).  
45 N.C.A.A. Const., Commitment to the Division I Collegiate Model, XIII 
(effective Aug. 1, 2020).  
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id.  
49 Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/amateurism 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2020).  
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their amateur status.50  If athletes are found to have violated any of 
the enumerated stipulations, their amateur status become at risk, and 
thus so does their eligibility to participate in college sports at the 
Division I and II level.51 
Although the athletes must receive a certificate of amateurism 
from the NCAA in order to be eligible to play and are subject to 
NCAA bylaws, they are not unionized and therefore cannot 
collectively bargain like athletes in leagues such as the NFL and 
NBA.52  In 2015, the Northwestern football team attempted to 
challenge this and become a recognized union with the National 
Labor Relations Board.53  This attempt was shut down, failing to 
address the issue of “whether the players, who spend long hours on 
football and help generate millions of dollars for Northwestern, are 
university employees.”54  The National Labor Relations Board 
dismissed the case due to the “potentially wide-ranging impacts on 
college sports [that] would not have promoted ‘stability in labor 
relations.’”55  After the decision, Northwestern University 
spokesperson, Alan Cubbage released a statement that the University 
was “pleased that the N.L.R.B. has agreed with the university’s 
position.”56  The chief legal officer of the NCAA, Donald Remy, 
released a similar statement saying “[t]his union-backed attempt to 
turn student-athletes into employees undermines the purpose of 
college: an education.  Student-athletes are not employees.”57  
 
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 Ben Strauss, N.L.R.B. Rejects Northwestern Football Players' Union Bid, N.Y. 





55 Id.  
56 Id. (Northwestern University was opposed to the idea of a unionized team, and 
the implications of such a decision.). 
57 Donald Remy, NCAA Responds to Union Proposal, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/press-releases/ncaa-responds-
union-proposal (last visited Mar. 12, 2020).  
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D. The Commercial Nature of College Athletics 
NCAA President Mark Emmert says that college sports are 
about education of students and competing.58  This is the same 
NCAA that reported a revenue of $1,118,495,545.00 in August of 
2019.59  In August 2019, television deals brought in a whopping 
$867,527,070.00, accounting for the majority of the NCAA’s 
revenue.60  Despite how astounding those numbers may seem, it is 
just a drop in the bucket of the money college athletics produce.  The 
true money at play in a single college game was perfectly highlighted 
on February 20, 2019.61   
The highly anticipated and biggest rivalry game in college 
basketball just tipped off.62  The number one team in the nation 
during the 2019 season, the Duke Blue Devils, played against the 
eighth ranked team, the University of North Carolina (UNC) Tar 
Heels.63  Duke, outfitted in their Nike sponsored gear, took the ball 
out after UNC scored on their opening possession.64  The ball was 
brought up the court and passed over to the future number one overall 
pick in the NBA draft, Zion Williamson.  As everyone watching had 
their eyes glued to their screens hoping to see one of his patented 
high-flying dunks, Zion drove to the rim at full speed.  Zion made a 
hard cut, causing his Nike sneaker to rupture underneath him.  He 
subsequently slipped and suffered a knee injury.65  The following 
day, Nike stock dropped over one billion dollars.66  This situation 
exemplifies the fact that these young athletes can have nearly a 
billion dollars riding on their performance and health in every 
matchup.  Furthermore, if Zion had been more seriously injured and 
 
58 Mark Emmert, Office of the President, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-
we-are/office-president (last visited Sept. 18, 2020). 
59 National Collegiate Athletic Association Consolidated Financial Statements, 




61 Kate Gibson, Nike’s High-Profile Shoe Fail Costs $1.1 Billion In Stock Value, 
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“slipped past the number sixteen overall pick in the 2019 National 
Basketball Association (“NBA”) draft,” he would have “been entitled 
to collect on an $8 million loss-of-value insurance policy--that Duke 
University paid $50 thousand in premiums for.”67 
Star-players like Zion have turned the NCAA into a money-
making machine, which in turn has led to lucrative salaries for the 
athletic directors and coaches of Division I schools.  The average 
salary for an athletic director at a Division I school has surpassed five 
hundred thousand dollars a year.68  This is a number that barely 
scratches the surface of coach salaries.  As reported in 2019, “there 
were 176 college football and men’s basketball coaches who received 
salaries exceeding $1 million, 71 whose salaries exceeded $3 million, 
and 38 whose salaries exceeded $4 million.”69  Among the highest 
paid is Dabo Swinney, the head coach of the Clemson University 
football team, with a reported salary of $9.3 million dollars and $1.1 
million dollars in bonuses.70  If Clemson decides they want to move 
on from Swinney before his contract is up, they will have to pay him 
$50 million dollars pursuant to his buyout clause.71  Swinney is not 
the “exception to the rule” either, and “the head football or basketball 
coach on a college team within the state makes more in guaranteed 
compensation than the state’s governor.”72  Additionally, it is not just 
lucrative salaries that these coaches receive.  Generally speaking, 
members of the coaching staff get a variety of off the field benefits 
from “free use of cars, housing subsidies, country-club memberships, 
private jet services, exceptionally generous severance packages and 
more.”73  Moreover, they gain the opportunity to subsidize their 
salaries by way of apparel and sneaker endorsements to book 
 
67 Meyer & Zumbalist, supra note 30, at 257, citing Mike Chiari, Report: Zion 
Williamson's $8M Insurance Policy Revealed After Injury vs. UNC, BLEACHER 
REP. (Feb. 12, 2019), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2821748-report-zion-
williamsons-8m-insurance-policy-revealed-after-injury-vs-unc. 
68 House et al., 4:20-cv-0319, June 8, 2020. at 1. 
69 Meyer & Zumbalist, supra note 30, at 261. 
70 2019 NCAAF Coaches Salaries, USA TODAY, 
https://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2020). 
71 Id.  
72 Meyer & Zumbalist, supra note 30, at 262, citing, Reuben Fischer-
Baum, Infographic: Is Your State's Highest-Paid Employee a Coach? (Probably), 
DEADSPIN (May 9, 2013, 3:23 PM), http://deadspin.com/infographic-is-your-states-
highest-paid-employee-a-co-489635228. 
73 Id. at 261. 
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contracts.74  All the while, the athletes themselves have historically 
been prohibited from reaping the benefits of their own athletic 
abilities. 
Although the NCAA likes to claim that the athletes are 
amateurs and the main goal of the NCAA is to educate the student-
athletes,75 the NCAA has still turned college sports into a billion-
dollar industry.76  The NCAA brings in nearly one billion dollars 
through television deals alone.77  The apparel companies get to 
display their products before the eyes of millions of weekly viewers, 
which, as previously shown, leads there to be billions of dollars at 
play each time superstar athletes suit up.78  The universities 
strategically use the popular athletes in their athletic programs to 
promote their merchandise, ticket sales and social media influence.79  
In turn, the athletic directors are rewarded with lucrative salaries,80 
salaries that still pale in comparison to the salaries of the coaches,81 
who also gain off the field benefits.82  All of this demonstrates that 
the NCAA’s loud proclamations of education are nothing but a 
smoke screen to hide the multi-billion-dollar business that it has 
created on the backs of uncompensated athletes. 
 
74 Id. at 261-62.  
75 Remy, supra note 56. 
76 Steve Cameron, The NCAA Brings In $1 Billion A Year – Here’s Why It Refuses 
To Pay Its College Athletes, INSIDER (Mar. 26, 2019, 10:14 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/ncaa-college-athletes-march-madness-basketball-
football-sports-not-paid-2019-3.   
77 NCAA Consolidated Financial Statements, August 31, 2019 and 2018, NCAA, 
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/ncaa/finance/2018-
19NCAAFin_NCAAFinancials.pdf. 
78 Kate Gibson, Nike’s High-Profile Shoe Fail Costs $1.1 Billion In Stock Value, 
CBS NEWS (Feb. 21, 2019, 4:23 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nike-stock-
drop-zion-williamson-shoe-incident-and-injury-costs-1-1-billion-in-stock-value. 
79 House et al. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n et al., 4:20-cv-0319, June 8, 2020. 
80 Id. at 1. 
81 Meyer & Zumbalist, supra note 30, at 261. 
82 Id. at 262. 
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III. THE NCAA AND COURTS EVOLVING APPROACH TO NILS 
A. Brief History 
One of the earliest reforms of intercollegiate sports was the 
adoption of the amateurism rule in 1921.83  This adoption was an 
attempt to curb the problem of schools paying athletes to attend their 
universities.84  However, the schools found creative ways around the 
NCAA’s attempts.85  In 1948, the NCAA adopted the “Sanity Code” 
which did not allow universities to give out scholarships, or financial 
aid in any way that was not available to an ordinary student.86  The 
NCAA also created “a Compliance Committee that could terminate 
an institution’s NCAA membership.”87  In 1956, the NCAA changed 
its rules to allow schools to give scholarships on athletic ability, yet 
were still limited to “full grant-in-aid,”88 and anything over it would 
leave athletes at risk of losing their amateur status.89  It was not until 
2014 that schools were able to offer scholarships for the full cost of 
attendance due to athletic ability.90  Nevertheless, NCAA bylaws still 
restricted an athlete “with few exceptions – from receiving any ‘pay’” 
based on his athletic ability, whether from boosters, companies 
seeking endorsements, or would-be licensors of the athlete’s name, 
image, and likeness.”91  As these rules have evolved, there has been 
litigation challenging them.  The most successful way litigants have 
attacked the NCAA bylaws has been through the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.92 
 





87 The NCAA in its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust 
Recidivist? 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 333 (2007). 
88 Grant in aid covers only cost of tuition, room and board and required textbooks. 
89 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054 (9th Cir. 2015). 
90 Id. 
91 Id.  
92 Meyer & Zumbalist, supra note 30, at 269. 
92683 F.3d 328, 340 (7th Cir. 2012). 
13
Palmieri: Compensation through NIL
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021
1618 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 37 
B. The Sherman Antitrust Act and the NCAA Bylaws 
The Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted to regulate 
commerce,93 prohibiting “[e]very contract, combination in the form 
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several states, or with foreign nations.”94  Although the 
Sherman Antitrust Act was not originally intended to regulate 
organizations such as the NCAA, it has “been the most fertile ground 
for chipping away at the NCAA’s amateurism rules.”95  In Agnew v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Association, the Seventh Circuit held 
that “no knowledgeable observer could earnestly assert that big-time 
college football programs . . . do not anticipate economic gain from a 
successful recruiting program.”96  The court further added that even 
though universities that are members of the NCAA are nonprofit in 
status, “the transactions those schools make with premier athletes--
full scholarships in exchange for athletic services--are not 
noncommercial, since schools can make millions of dollars as a result 
of these transactions.”97  Thus, both the NCAA and the member 
universities are subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act.98  
C. O’Bannon Litigation 
In 2009, former UCLA Bruin basketball player Ed O’Bannon 
brought suit against the Collegian Licensing Company (CLC) after 
recognizing himself as a character in a video game created by EA 
Sports.99  O’Bannon challenged the NCAA’s amateurism rules on the 
ground that they violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by not permitting 
him or other athletes to gain compensation on their NILs.100  In 2013, 
class certification was granted for all former and current Division I 
athletes in football and basketball, whose NILs were used in video 
games licensed by the CLC.101  The athletes sought payment in 
specific areas, all of which were prohibited by the NCAA bylaws at 
 
93 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
94 Id. 
95 Meyer & Zumbalist, supra note 30, at 269. 
96683 F.3d 328, 340 (7th Cir. 2012). 
97 Id.  
98 Id. 
99 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1056 (9th Cir. 2015). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1055-1056. 
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the time: sports video games, game rebroadcasts, advertisements, and 
other archival footage.102 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California recognized that few athletes chose to play in foreign 
markets or minor league professional sports, “and athletes are not 
allowed to join either the NFL or the NBA directly from high 
school.”103  The conclusion drawn by the district court led it to hold 
that “there are no professional [or college] football or basketball 
leagues capable of supplying a substitute for the bundle of goods and 
services that the Football Bowl Subdivision (the “FBS”) and Division 
I basketball schools provide.”104  Consequently, the court held that 
the NCAA bylaws were subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act even 
though they are not directly commercial in nature.105  Ultimately, the 
lower court held that the bylaws were in violation of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.106 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the 
schools were actively engaging in price-fixing agreements by 
obtaining the athletes’ licensing through the CLC without having to 
pay the athletes themselves.107  The court, however, agreed with the 
NCAA that amateurism and its integration into NCAA regulations 
did have pro-competitive aspects, such as giving athletes a robust 
choice of schools, as well as maintaining the popularity of 
intercollegiate sports.108  Lastly, when addressing the “less restrictive 
alternative” proposed, which would allow the schools to place 
deferred compensation of up to $5 thousand per year into a trust 
based on licensing revenue that the athlete brought in,109 Judge Bybee 
wrote:  
 
The difference between offering student-athletes 
education-related compensation and offering them 
cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not 
minor; it is a quantum leap.  Once that line is crossed, 
 
102 O’Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 963 (N.D. Cal. 
2014). 
103 Id. at 966. 
104 Id. at 968.  
105 Id. at 1061.  
106 Id. 
107 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1057 (9th Cir. 2015). 
108 Id. at 1072. 
109 Id. at 1053. 
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we see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism 
and no defined stopping point . . . At that point the 
NCAA will have surrendered its amateurism 
principles and transitioned from its ‘particular brand 
of football’ to minor league status.110 
 
Judge Bybee’s opinion was not fully shared by the majority.111  Judge 
Thomas wrote separately on the decision to voice his displeasure.112  
Judge Thomas argued that the NCAA’s own expert witness’s 
testimony proved that putting the money in trusts would have a very 
limited impact on consumer demand for college athletics.113  
Furthermore, he asserted that any negative impact “could be partially 
mitigated by placing the compensation in trust funds to be paid out 
after graduation.”114 
Ultimately, the court was split, with the majority finding that 
the deferred compensation option violated the amateurism principles 
due to the lack of a tie to academics.115  This decision left neither 
party going home happy, which became clear when both sides 
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was 
ultimately denied.116  As a result, the NCAA's regulations were left 
vulnerable to more challenges.117 
1. Reaction of The NCAA And Major 
Conferences Post O’Bannon Decision 
The NCAA’s dissatisfaction with the ultimate ruling can be 
clearly shown through its petition to the Supreme Court,118  stating 
that “[t]he NCAA should not have to undergo a full trial (and years of 
litigation) or face treble damages whenever a plaintiff or counsel hits 
 
110 Id. at 1078-79 (quoting Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984)). 
111 Id. at 1080 (Thomas, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 1078. 
116 O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016). 
117 Meyer & Zumbalist, supra note 30, at 274. 
118 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. O'Bannon, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016) (No. 15-
1388). 
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on a supposedly better way to administer college athletics.”119  In 
addition to its petition to the Supreme Court, NCAA President Mark 
Emmert released an initial statement where he said that while the 
NCAA “agree[d] with the court that the injunction ‘allowing students 
to be paid cash compensation of up to $5,000 per year was erroneous 
. . .’[the NCAA] disagree[s] that it should be mandated by the courts” 
because the NCAA allows schools to “provide up to full cost of 
attendance” for student athletes.120 
The top thirty-one conferences released a joint statement as 
well.121  They collectively stated that they were pleased with the 
court’s decision only to the extent that it reversed the district court’s 
ruling with regard to the $5 thousand deferred payment option.122  
The conferences underlined their “company motto” by stating “[i]t’s 
important to remember that we’re talking about students, not 
employees.  Our goal is for our students to learn teamwork and 
leadership through sports, and then graduate and be successful.”123   
2. Summary of the Major O’Bannon 
Implications 
In addition to O’Bannon’s disappointment, the NCAA and the 
major conferences were not pleased with the outcome of the case.  
This case demonstrated that that the NCAA was vulnerable to 
litigation, especially through the Sherman Antitrust Act.124  It is 
important to note the tone in the responses to O’Bannon from the 
NCAA and the conferences,125 as it quickly evolved over time.  At 
this juncture, the NCAA understood that this decision left it 
 
119 Id. at 26-27. 
120 Mark Emmert, Initial NCAA Statement Regarding O’Bannon Decision, NCAA 
(Sept. 30, 2015, 10:51 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/news/initial-ncaa-statement-regarding-o-bannon-decision. 
121 The Coalition to Protect and Improve the Student-Athlete Experience Responds 





124 See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1061 (9th Cir. 2015).  
125 Id.; see also Emmert, supra note 119; see also The Coalition to Protect and 
Improve the Student-Athlete Experience responds to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision in O’Bannon Case, supra note 120. 
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vulnerable to future litigation,126 which made it uneasy.  
Consequently, the NCAA and the conferences stood together starkly 
against compensating athletes in any manner.127  Despite the NCAA’s 
clear view on the subject, future challenges arose. 
D. Grant-In-Aid Litigation 
The fear of the NCAA becoming susceptible to further 
litigation quickly became reality when two class action suits raised 
challenges to the NCAA’s amateurism rules: Jenkins v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Association,128 and Alston v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Association.129  Collectively, these claims became known as 
In re National Collegiate Athletic Association Athletic Grant-in-Aid 
Cap Antitrust Litigation130(“Grant-in-Aid”), and the case made its 
way to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Grant-in-Aid had three 
parties certified for the class: (1) students who played in the Football 
Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”); (2) male Division I basketball players; 
and (3) female Division I basketball players.131   
While both O’Bannon and Grant-in-Aid targeted the NCAA’s 
amateurism rules, O’Bannon focused specifically on NILs,132 
whereas Grant-in-Aid widened the scope.133  The plaintiffs in this 
action argued – perhaps not successfully that schools are “buyers of 
athletic services.”134  As the buyers, the schools “exercise [a] 
monopoly power to artificially cap compensation at a level that is not 
commensurate with student-athletes’ value.”135  Consequently, but 
for the restraints in the NCAA bylaws, specifically bylaw 15.01.2, 
which prohibits any student-athlete from receiving financial aid other 
 
126 See Meyer & Zumbalist, supra note 30, at 274. 
127 See Emmert, supra note 119; see also The Coalition to Protect and Improve the 
Student-Athlete Experience responds to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decision in 
O’Bannon Case, supra note 120. 
128 In re Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 
375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
129 In re Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 
311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
130 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir., 2020). 
131 Id. at 1243. 
132 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1056 (9th Cir. 2015). 
133 See generally Grant-in-Aid, 958 F.3d at 1248. 
134 Id. 
135 Id., citing In re Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust 
Litigation, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1068 (2019).  
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than what they are eligible for through intercollegiate athletics and 
penalizes  violations by stripping the athlete of their amateur 
status,136 the plaintiffs argued that schools would offer recruits 
coming out of high school a higher compensation package that 
correlates more closely to their talents and values.137  Therefore, they 
argued, these restraints violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.138   
The District Court for the Northern District of California held 
that the NCAA’s limitations on benefits that student athletes could 
receive were unreasonable restraints on trade, and the court went on 
to enjoin those limits.139  However, the court did not go as far as the 
plaintiffs wanted and held that the NCAA limits on compensation did 
not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act.140  The NCAA appealed this 
decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.141 
1. Before the Appeal 
In the time after the ruling from the Northern District Court of 
California and before the appeal to the Ninth Circuit there was a 
ground-breaking development.  California enacted the Fair Pay to 
Play Act.142  Generally, the Fair Pay to Play Act provides that any 
California school that is a member of the NCAA is not allowed to 
limit an athlete’s ability to receive compensation from his NILs.143  In 
the wake of this legislation, NCAA President Mark Emmert stated 
that the NCAA would not take “any action that is contrary to the 
position advocated by the NCAA or accepted by the Ninth Circuit 
with respect to the type of NIL payments that were at issue in the 
O’Bannon case[.]”144 
 
136 N.C.A.A. Const. art. XV, § 15.01.2 (effective Aug. 1, 2020).  
137 Grant-in-Aid, 958 F.3d at 1248. 
138 See id. 
139 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, 375 F. 
Supp.3d at 1109. 
140 Id. 
141 Grant-in-Aid, 958 F.3d at 1241. 
142 Infra note 160. 
143 See Compensation from use of student’s name, image, or likeness; participation 
and scholarship eligibility; professional representation, Cal. Educ. Code § 67456 
(West 2020, operative Jan. 1, 2023). 
144 See Hearing Before U.S. S. Commerce Subcomm. on Manufacturing, Trade and 
Consumer Protection, (Feb. 11, 2020) (statement of Mark Emmert, President, 
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2. On Appeal 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the lower court 
properly applied the “Rule of Reason.”145  The Rule of Reason has 
three steps.  As applicable to this litigation those steps were: (1) the 
athletes would have to show that the alleged restraint has a significant 
anticompetitive impact within the identified relevant market; (2) if 
this is met, the NCAA would have to combat the anticompetitive 
impact by showing evidence that the restraints in fact have a 
procompetitive impact; and (3) finally, if the NCAA meets its burden, 
the athletes will then have to produce another proposal to the 
restraints that is substantially less restrictive.146  To meet this third 
step, the athlete must prove that the alternative is practically as 
effective, while still serving the same procompetitive purpose of the 
NCAA.147 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the lower 
court on all points.148  The court held that the district court properly 
found that the restriction had anticompetitive behavior due to “elite 
student-athletes lack[ing] any viable alternatives to [Division I], 
[forcing them] to accept[.]”149  The court further added that it is still 
anticompetitive with “whatever compensation is offered to them by 
[Division I] schools, regardless of whether any such compensation is 
an accurate reflection of the competitive value of their athletic 
services.”150  The NCAA met its burden on step two of the Rule of 
Reason by justifying that the restrictions preserve the demand in that 
it prevents salaries to the equivalent of professional athletes.  
However, the Court extended the holding as it pertains to the 
education-related benefits.151  On the third step of analysis, the 
athletes’ proposed that there should be uncapped education-related 
benefits, which the Ninth Circuit also upheld.152  The court found that 




145 Grant-in-Aid, 958 F.3d at 1241. 
146 Id. at 1257. 
147 Id. at 1260. 
148 Id at 1241. 
149 Id. at 1257. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 1260. 
152 Id.  
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standards in place, and that it would not deter the fans.153  Ultimately, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the education-related restraints were in 
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and were enjoined, however 
the court refused to extend the restraints to include non-education 
related compensation.154  Thus, the athletes won the battle, but not the 
war, albeit a massive battle.   
3. NCAA Response to the Ruling 
Almost immediately following the Ninth Circuit decision, the 
NCAA petitioned the Supreme Court to review the determination.155  
The NCAA’s chief legal officer, Donald M. Remy, published a press 
release in which he challenged the Ninth Circuit ruling, stating that it 
inconsistently applied the antitrust rules comparatively to other 
federal courts as well as the Supreme Court.156  Mr. Remy was highly 
concerned with the potential fallout following this decision, and went 
on to say that he believed this ruling “blurs the lines between college 
and professional sports.”157  Further, he added that the decision 
“appoints a single court to micromanage collegiate sports, and 
encourages never-ending litigation following every rule change.”158  
As expected, the same fears the NCAA had post-O’Bannon had only 
been expounded by another adverse ruling.  Ultimately, Alston made 
it all the way to the Supreme Court.159 
4. Supreme Court Ruling 
In a landmark unanimous decision, delivered on June 21, 
2021, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision by 
holding that the NCAA rules that limit education-related benefits are 
 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 1241. 
155 Donald M. Remy, NCAA Statement Regarding Supreme Court Petition For 




157 Id.  
158 Id. 
159 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Alston, 141. S.Ct. 1231 (Dec. 16, 2020) 
(granting the writ of certiorari.). 
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inconsistent with antitrust principles.160  While this case did not 
involve the NIL policy of the NCAA, it practically rubs elbows with 
it.  Justice Gorsuch wrote, “[p]ut simply, this suit involved admitted 
horizontal price fixing in a market where the [NCAA] exercise 
monopoly control.”161  The NCAA tried to argue that the Ninth 
Circuit holding would be exploited by universities, resulting in 
college athletes receiving unnecessarily valuable items.162  However, 
the Court specified that “[u]nder the current decree, the NCAA is free 
to forbid in-kind benefits unrelated to a student’s actual education; 
nothing stops it from enforcing a ‘no Lamborghini’ rule.’”163  While 
the Court was careful to make a distinction between what was at issue 
in this case and the NIL policy of the NCAA, Justice Kavanaugh did 
not hold back in his concurrence.  Justice Kavanaugh put it bluntly 
when he stated “[t]he NCAA’s business model would be flatly illegal 
in almost any other industry in America.”164  Justice Kavanaugh 
added an extra jab when he stated that the NCAA’s argument for 
justifying not paying student athletes was “circular” and “highly 
questionable.”165  Justice Kavanaugh further added “if that asserted 
justification is unavailing, it is not clear how the NCAA can legally 
defend its remaining compensation rules.”166  Justice Kavanaugh 
further clarified his stance when he stated that the “bottom line is that 
the NCAA and its member colleges are suppressing the pay of 
student athletes who collectively generate billions of dollars in 
revenue for colleges every year.”167  As such, the NCAA was put on 
notice by the Supreme Court whose justices essentially provided the 
NCAA with an ultimatum: either make a change or we will. 
5. Summary of Grant-in-Aid  
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that 
the lower court had properly applied the Rule of Reason and affirmed 
 





164 Id. (Kavanaugh concurrence).  
165 Id. (noting that the NCAA argues “that its compensation rules are 
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the district court judgment enjoining the NCAA rules regulating 
education related compensation.168  This is one of the biggest wounds 
in the NCAA’s regulations regarding the amateur status of college 
athletes.  This class action and its outcome was exactly what the 
NCAA and the thirty-one conferences were worried about in the 
wake of the O’Bannon decision.169  Their fears became reality in the 
following two forms: (a) the Court took the NCAA’s regulations into 
their hands, which is something that the NCAA believes the Court 
lacks the proper expertise and qualifications to do; and (b) various 
states have struck down NCAA regulations on NILS through 
legislation.170   
IV. STATES TAKING THE REGULATIONS INTO THEIR OWN 
HANDS 
A. The Fair Pay to Play Act 
Shockwaves echoed throughout the sports world when the 
California State legislature unanimously passed,171 and Governor 
Gavin Newsom signed the Fair Pay to Play Act (S.B. 206) into 
law.172  Nancy Skinner, a California state senator and author of the 
bill, said of the bill’s intent: “[s]tudent athletes need to financially 
strike while the iron is hot and draw compensation for their 
performance in collegiate athletics.  It is only fair because it is the 
athletes who are the draw in these hugely profitable activities.”173  
 
168 Grant-in-Aid, 958 F.3d at 1241. 
169 O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016); see also 
Emmert, supra note 119, see also The Coalition to Protect and Improve the 
Student-Athlete Experience responds to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decision in 
O’Bannon Case, supra note 120. 
170 Infra note 172. 
171 California Legislature, SB-206 Collegiate Athletics, Student Athlete 
Compensation And Representation, CAL. LEGIS. INFO. (2019-2020), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200S
B206. 
172CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (West 2019). 
173See Alicia Jessop, Fool Me Once, Shame On You; Fool Me Twice, Shame On 
Me: Why Congress Must Grant NCAA Athletes Group Licensing And Organization 
Rights in Name, Image and Likeness Legislation, HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT L. (Aug. 
31, 2020), https://harvardjsel.com/2020/08/fool-me-once-shame-on-you-fool-me-
twice-shame-on-me-why-congress-must-grant-ncaa-athletes-group-licensing-and-
organization-rights-in-name-image-and-likeness-legislation (citing Collegiate 
Athletics: Fair Pay to Play Act: Hearing on SB 206 Before the Cal. S. Assembly 
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The act, just a mere two-pages long, is set to go toe-to-toe with the 
institutional goliath that is the NCAA when it goes into effect in 
2023.174  Although it will be preempted by the NCAA’s interim NIL 
policy, the California state legislature effectively put a time limit on 
the old NCAA business model by being the first state to push the 
envelope. 
1. What the Act Provides 
The Fair Pay to Play Act “requires intercollegiate athletic 
programs at 4-year private universities or campuses of the University 
of California or the California State University that receive, as an 
average, $10 million or more in annual revenue derived from media 
rights for intercollegiate athletics to comply with prescribed 
requirements relating to student athlete rights.”175  Significantly, S.B. 
206 provides that any school that meets these requirements are not 
allowed to uphold any standard, requirement, rule or any other 
limitation that in turn prevents, in any way, student athletes’ ability to 
earn compensation from their NILs.176  Additionally under the law, 
the ability to earn compensation from their NILs has no effect on the 
respective student athlete’s scholarship eligibility.177 
It is important to note that the Act does not apply to 
prospective athletes, and if student athletes hire a sports agent, they 
still must be licensed by and follow the federal Sports Agent 
Responsibility and Trust Act.178  Moreover, the title of the Act may 
be slightly misleading.  The Fair Pay to Play Act “does not create an 
employer-employee relationship: neither of those words even appear 
in the bill.”179  Furthermore, “California student-athletes will not be 
paid to play, nor is there any text pondering what pay would be 
‘fair.’”180  
 
Committee on Arts, Entertainment, Sports, Tourism, and Internet Media (2020) 
(comments of Nancy Skinner, California state senator and bill author)). 




178 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (West 2019). 
179 Alexander Lowitt, Full Court Press: Legal Vulnerabilities Of California's Fair 
Pay To Play Act, 11 WAKE FOREST J. L. P.S.S. 20, 27-28 (2020). 
180 Id. at 28. 
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B. The Others Following Suit 
Although California was the first to pass such a bill, it has not 
been the last.  Many states have followed suit, passing their own 
respective versions of the Fair Pay to Play Act.181  The following 
states have either adopted, or considered a similar bill: Florida, 
Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, and Tennessee.182  The various bills are all vastly similar.  
Among the similarities are the inability to limit or prevent a student 
athlete from being compensated from their NILs, athletes being 
entitled to representation either by a lawyer or sports agent.  
Additionally, student athletes have to disclose any NIL contracts with 
the institution they attend, to ensure that these agreements do not 
conflict with any other deals the institution is a party to.183   
Although there are similarities between these bills, there are 
also variations among them.  A notable difference is “whether they 
prohibit or are silent as to providing compensation for prospective 
student athletes.”184  This variation is of specific importance in 
relation to recruiting athletes.  Schools that are located within states 
that allow compensation for prospective student athletes will be at an 
inherent advantage in comparison to those schools in states where it 
is prohibited.  In an almost avalanche-like fashion, this will have an 
impact on the competitive nature of all college sports across the 
nation.  The consequences of a potential nationwide standard, or lack 
thereof will be further discussed in Section VI.185  The bills also 
differ in terms of dates where each state’s respective bill goes into 
effect.186  The earliest change to go into effect is Florida’s bill, S.B. 
646 which is set to be effective on July 1, 2021.187  Now that the 
NCAA has adopted a preliminary interim policy, the clock is ticking 
for potential standardized federal legislation. 
 
181 Nicole Berkowitz et. al, More States Draft Legislation To Address Student 
Athlete Compensation As The NCAA Passes The Ball To Congress, LEXOLOGY 
(Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5701fc57-8d88-
46bc-9569-43f5b3ca6a5e.  
182 Id. 
183 Id.  
184 Id. 
185 See infra Section VI. 
186 Berkowitz et al., supra note 180. 
187 FLA. STAT. § 1006.74 (2020). 
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C. Why This Creates More Issues 
States across the nation have presented their own solutions for 
how the NCAA bylaws should change.  However, as mentioned 
above, allowing these statutes to come into effect without a form of 
national standardization will have a significant impact on the 
competitive nature of college sports, particularly in the area of 
recruiting.  Recruiting is one of the most essential parts of building a 
highly competitive and profitable sports program. For example, 
imagine a highly talented athlete is choosing between two schools: 
one where a version of the “Fair Pay-for-Play Act” has been enacted 
(school one) and one with a law that is more restrictive (school two).  
No matter what school two has to offer, the athletes at school two are 
at an inherent disadvantage because school one will be able to tell the 
athletes that while they receive an education and compete in the 
highest level of amateur athletics, they will also be able to earn 
money from their popularity in more ways than school two can offer.  
This is clearly a strong incentive for students to attend schools 
located in states with laws like the “Fair Pay-for-Play Act.”  This is a 
situation that the NCAA wants to avoid at all costs, as it directly 
impacts the completive nature of college sports and further adds to 
the need for standardized legislation. 
V. THE NCAA RESPONSE 
A. The Initial Response Pre-Alston 
After the Pay-for-Play Act was signed into law, the NCAA 
sent a letter to Governor Newsom stating that the bill was both 
“harmful” and “unconstitutional.”188  Yet, in a seemingly inconsistent 
act with that statement a month after the bill was signed, the NCAA 
stated in a press release that its Board of Governors unanimously 
agreed to look into opportunities for student athletes to obtain 
compensation derived from NILs, so long as it was consistent with 
the core principles of the NCAA.189  The NCAA convened a meeting 
 
188 Letter from NCAA Bd. of Governors to Gavin Newsom, Governor, State of Cal. 
(Sept. 11, 2019), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resoresou/media-center/news/ncaa-
repsonds-california-senate-bill-206. 
189Board of Governors Starts Process to Enhance Name, Image and Likeness 
Opportunities, NCAA (Oct. 29, 2019), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
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of a “D-I Name, Image and Likeness Legislative Solutions Group,” 
which authored a 22-page document outlining all the changes to the 
bylaws specific to NILs.190  Among the changes outlined in the 
document was allowing athletes to be compensated for hosting 
private lessons, operating their own camps and clinics, starring in 
commercials, hosting autographing sessions, as well as obtaining 
money for emergencies through sources such as GoFundMe and 
other crowdfunding methods.191   
In the original proposal, there were still limits.  One of the 
most significant limitations applying to almost all of the changes is 
the inability to use school marks or revealing what school that 
student-athlete attends.192  Moreover, schools themselves are given 
the ability to prohibit an athlete’s involvement in NIL “activities that 
conflict with existing institutional sponsorship arrangements or other 
school ‘values.’”193  This prohibition is similarly seen across state 
statutes.194  The NCAA proposal also places significant limitations on 
athletes entering into deals with a sports agent, only allowing these 
relationships under three circumstances:195 “NIL ventures, assist[ing] 
in contract negotiations and help[ing] market an athlete’s NIL 
ventures.”196  This is a much stricter limitation than those of the state 
proposals.197  
The proposed changes were supposed to be voted on and 
formally approved in January 2021;198 however, the NCAA halted its 




190 Pat Forde & Ross Dellenger, NCAA’s Name, Image, Likeness Legislation 






194 Berkowitz et al., supra note 180. 
195 Forde & Dellenger, supra note 189.  
196 Id. 
197 Id.; compare FLA. STAT. § 1006.74; see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (West 
2019). 
198 Forde & Dellenger, supra note 189. 
199 Dennis Dodd & Matt Norlander, NCAA Expected To Table Planned Vote On 
Name, Image, Likeness Rights Amid Supreme Court Case, Senate Changes, CBS 
SPORTS (Jan. 9, 2021, 4:53 PM), https://www.cbssports.com/college-
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to when it was scheduled to take place.200  The NCAA cited a 
pending Supreme Court case,201 other legal challenges, and changes 
in the White House and the Senate as the reasons for the indefinite 
delay.202  NCAA President Mark Emmert doubled down in a letter to 
the assistant attorney general, where he stated that “‘[the NCAA’s] 
current amateurism and other rules are indeed fully compliant’ with 
federal antitrust rules.”203  He further added that the NCAA 
welcomes the invitation extended by the Justice Department to 
consult with and understand their views on the subject.204 
B. Post Alston Policy 
In the wake of the game-changing Supreme Court decision in 
Alston,205 the NCAA position on NILs changed drastically.  After 
having previously tabled its vote on the NIL policy, within a matter 
of days after the Alston decision came down, the NCAA adopted an 
interim NIL policy.206  While Alston did not address whether the anti-
NIL policy of the NCAA violated antitrust laws, the writing on the 





201 The NCAA was waiting for a decision in Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. 
Alston. The NCAA challenged the decision from the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals which held that the NCAA compensation rules violated federal antitrust 
laws. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Shawne Alston, et al., 141 S.Ct. 2141, 2144 
(2021).  The Ninth Circuit applied the Rule-of-Reason analysis; however, the 
NCAA argued that the court was too fact intensive in its approach. Id. The NCAA 
further argued that the Ninth Circuit holding would effectively allow a single court 
the powers of nationwide supervision over the entirety of intercollegiate athletics, 
stating that “antitrust laws do not deputize district judges as one-man regulatory 
agencies. Id at 5 (citing American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 
1230, 1249 (3rd Cir. 1975)).  Adding that antitrust suits are not the manner to 
“second guess business judgments” (emphasis added). Id. (citing Chicago 
Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
202 Id. 
203 Alan Blinder, N.C.A.A. President Seeks Delay on Vote to Let Students Profit 




205 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Alston, 594 U.S., at 36 (2021), 
supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20-512_gfbh.pdf. 
206 Hosick, supra note 11. 
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NCAA business model would not stand for much longer.207  The 
NCAA’s interim policy is a mere outline of what will be needed to 
address this issue.  Yet, this policy is a historic step for the rights of 
college athletes, and a reversal of the previous stance of the 
NCAA.208 
1. What the Interim Policy Provides 
The policy as shown on the NCAA website spans a total of four 
bullet points.209  It provides that 
 
Individuals can engage in NIL activities that are 
consistent with the law of the state where the school is 
located. Colleges and universities may be a resource 
for state law questions. College athletes who attend a 
school in a state without an NIL law can engage in this 
type of activity without violating NCAA rules related 
to name, image and likeness. Individuals can use a 
professional services provider for NIL activities. 
Student-athletes should report NIL activities 
consistent with state law or school and conference 
requirements to their school.210 
 
The flood gates are now open.  With states taking a different stance 
on how they choose to address NILs, the current policy impacts 
respective schools and consequently the athletes at those schools 
differently.211  Understanding this issue, NCAA President Mark 
Emmert stated that due to “the variety of state laws adopted across 
the country, we will continue to work with Congress to develop a 
solution that will provide clarity on a national level.”212  The need for 
a standardized solution is more prominent now than ever. 
 
207 See supra notes 159-66. 
208 See Binder, supra note 202. 
209 Hosick, supra note 11. 
210 Hosick, supra note 11. 
211 See supra notes 183-86. 
212 Hosick, supra note 11. 
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2. What The Results Have Been 
Universities across the nation are preparing for the change 
and hoping to put the athletes who attend their school in the best 
situations possible, for now and the future.  This is the biggest stage 
that nearly all of these athletes will ever play on;213 therefore, their 
four years as college athletes give them the largest opportunity to 
capitalize on their popularity.  Among the first of surely many other 
universities, the University of Nebraska and the University of 
Colorado (“CU”), have announced programs “designed to help 
student-athletes build their personal brand if the NCAA’s NIL 
restraints are lifted.”214  The athletic director at CU “expressed his 
support for the new program, noting that, ‘building a personal brand, 
and developing the skills to be a successful entrepreneur will help our 
student-athletes capitalize and build on their time at CU and 
beyond.’”215   
Additionally, college athletes from all sports, all over the 
nation have been capitalizing on the new policy change and have 
wasted no time to do so.  Antwan Owens, a Jackson State football 
player, had a “midnight signing” with the company 3 Kings 
Grooming, making him the first athlete to sign an NIL deal.216  To 
date, the athlete making the most out of this new policy seems to be 
Bryce Young, the man set to be the starting quarterback for the 
Alabama Crimson Tide this upcoming season.217  Although he barely 
saw the field his first season with the Crimson Tide, Alabama head 
coach Nick Saban told the media that Young’s deals have totaled 
almost one million dollars.218  These deals have not only reached 
football players; Olivia Dunne, an 18 year old gymnast for LSU may 
 
213  Estimated Probability of Competing in Professional Athletics, supra note 12.  
214 House et al., 4:20-cv-0319, June 15, 2020 at 6. 
215 Id. (quoting David Plati, CU Announces “Buffs With A Brand” Program, 
CUBUFFS (June 1, 2020), https://cubuffs.com/news/2020/6/1/general-cu-
announces-buffs-with-a-brand-program.aspx. 
216 Elizabeth Karpen, Players Getting Paid: Here’s Who Signed NIL Deals on 
Policy’s First Day (July 1, 2021, 4:29 PM), N.Y. POST, 
https://nypost.com/2021/07/01/here-are-players-who-signed-nil-deals-on-policys-
first-day.  
217 Des Bieler, Nick Saban Reveals Alabama QB Bryce Young is Already Making 
‘Ungodly’ Profits off NIL Rights (July 20, 2021, 7:52 PM), WASH. POST, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2021/07/20/nick-saban-bryce-young-
ungodly-nil-profits. 
218 Id.  
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be the poster child for NIL deals.219  She is currently the only 
collegiate athlete to have over 1 million followers on both social 
media platforms TikTok and Instagram, with 4 million and 1.1 
million followers on both respectively.220  Olivia recently met with 
the “international talent agency giant Creative Artist Agency at 2000 
Avenue of the Stars in Los Angeles, which has represented Madonna 
and Cher.”221  Entertainment lawyers in the Baton Rouge area, where 
LSU is located, speculate that a deal with CAA or a similar company 
could bring her anything between four to five million dollars.222  
While some athletes have gone as far as starting their own companies 
to help their fellow athletes book events,223 others have not found 
their schools as open to NIL opportunities.224  Of note, Brigham 
Young University has informed their athletes that any and all deals 
they enter must conform to the schools’ honor code.225  It is 
important to note that at the time of writing, the NCAA’s interim NIL 
policy has only been in place for twenty-three days. 
VI. WILL THERE BE FEDERAL RESOLVE? 
To date there have been four congressional proposals made 
regarding college athletes’ rights to NIL compensation.226  Each of 
 
219 Glenn Guibeau, Olivia Dunne, LSU Gymnast and Social Media Queen, Could 






223 Tommy Beer, These NCAA Athletes Have Already Inked Endorsement Deals 
(July 1, 2021, 4:56 PM), FORBES, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommybeer/2021/07/01/these-ncaa-athletes-have-
already-inked-endorsement-deals/?sh=150cbdb44676 (stating that University of 
Miami quarterback D’Eriq King “partnered with Florida State quarterback 
McKenzie Milton to co-found Dreamfield, a company that will assist student-




226 Senators Booker (D-NJ) and Blumenthal (D-Conn) proposed the “College 
Athlete Bill of Rights”, Senator Wicker (R-Miss) introduced the Collegiate Athlete 
and Compensation Rights Act introduced, Senator Rubio (R-Fla) introduced 
the Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act presented by, and Representatives 
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the four proposals differ, and some of them are very far apart.  
Nevertheless, with the variation seen among state legislation, as well 
as the different stances taken by some universities, one thing is clear: 
there is a need for standardized legislation. 
A. The College Athlete Economic Freedom Act 
The most recent proposal from Connecticut Senator Chris 
Murphy and Massachusetts Congresswoman Lori Trahan is a bill 
dubbed the “College Athlete Economic Freedom Act.”227  They 
propose that there should be “unrestricted access to earning NIL 
income in individual and group NIL agreements.”228  The proposed 
Act provides that no college or university can collude with a third 
party to limit an athlete’s ability to contract and be compensated for 
his or her NILs.229  Moreover, the Act would not allow the NCAA to 
prohibit an athlete from retaining representation, whether that be an 
attorney, a financial advisor, or an agent,230 a provision that various 
state bills and laws do not include.231  This proposal also circumvents 
the unionization issues previously discussed, by legislating that the 
athletes would be granted the right to “organize through collective 
representation, like a trade association or 501(c) nonprofit.”232  This 
right would effectively allow the athletes to make group NIL 
agreements, such as video game agreements.233  Furthermore, the bill 
states that any violation of section 3 of the act shall be treated as a 
 
Gonzalez (R-Ohio) and Cleaver (D-Mo) introduced the bi-partisan Student Athlete 
Level Playing Field Act, see id.  
227 Id.  
228 Andrew Zimbalist, The College Athlete Economic Freedom Act Proposed In 




229 College Athlete Economic Freedom Act, S. 1, 117th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2021). 
230 See id. at § (3)(b)(1)(a); id at § (3)(b)(1)(b); id at § (3)(b)(2). 
231 Berkowitz, et al., supra note 180. 
232 Id. 
233 Gregg E. Clifton, Senator Murphy Introduces Additional Federal Name, Image 
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violation of 15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B).234  Lastly, any aggrieved private 
party may bring suit in the proper federal jurisdiction and any 
“violation of [the] Act shall be deemed to be a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act.”235  Despite the many rights that this proposal would 
afford college athletes, this is still not the most drastic proposal. 
B. The College Athlete Bill of Rights 
New Jersey Senator Cory Booker’s proposal is titled the 
“College Athlete Bill of Rights,” and out of all proposals it is the 
most expansive with respect to the rights awarded to the athletes.236  
Senator Booker, a former college athlete who played tight-end for 
Stanford football, took this issue to heart and offers first-hand 
experience with regard to the issues that these athletes face.237  
Regarding NIL rights, the proposal only allows colleges and 
institutions to restrict an athlete’s ability to market his or her NILs “if 
 
234 College Athlete Economic Freedom Act, S. 1, 117th Cong. § 5(a)(1) (2021). 15 
U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B) is a “violation of a rule defining an unfair or deceptive act or 
practices deprescribed under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act.” Id.  Federal Trade Commission Act18(a)(1)(B) is codified as 15 U.S.C. 
57(a)(1)(B). Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B) (2011) which provides that the 
Federal Trade Commission may prescribe: 
 
rules which define with specificity acts or practices which are 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce 
(within the meaning of section 45(a)(1) of this title), except that 
the Commission shall not develop or promulgate any trade rule or 
regulation with regard to the regulation of the development and 
utilization of the standards and certification activities pursuant to 
this section. Rules under this subparagraph may include 
requirements prescribed for the purpose of preventing such acts 
or practices. 
Id. 
235 College Athlete Economic Freedom Act, S. 1, 117th Cong. § 5(c) (2021).  
236 Doriyon C. Glass & Gregg E. Clifton, The Proposed “College Athletes Bill of 
Rights” Joins Growing Number of Federal Bills on Student-Athlete Rights, 




237 Ross Dellenger, Inside the Landmark College Athletes Bill of Rights Being 




Palmieri: Compensation through NIL
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021
1638 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 37 
the State also prohibits institutions of higher education located in the 
State from entering into agreements with such entities.”238  The 
athletes would also be prohibited from entering endorsement 
contracts with a list of entities provided by the institution they play 
for.239  While the act provides fewer freedoms in terms of NILs than 
the College Athlete Economic Freedom Act, this provision would 
require “schools to share 50% of their profit with athletes from 
revenue-generating sports, after accounting for cost of 
scholarships.”240  It also looks to bring in the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) and the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) to work with the Sports Science Institution as well 
as the NCAA to address “everything from how to handle concussion 
and traumatic brain injuries to sexual assault and interpersonal 
violence to athletics health care administration,”241 all of which are 
prominent issues in sports and college generally.  Along the lines of 
player safety and health, Senator Booker proposed that Congress 
should create a medical trust fund paid into by the higher education 
institutions to cover any and all “out-of-pocket expenses relating to 
any sports-related injury” extending for the five years after a player’s 
college athletic career has ended.242  Even though this proposal is 
more limited with respect to NILs, it is the most expansive in every 
other area.  
C. Student Athlete Level Playing Field Act 
Ohio Congressman Anthony Gonzalez’s plan is born from his 
experience as a former Ohio State wide receiver and NFL player.  
This plan deviates from the other proposals by calling for the creation 
of what is called the “Covered Athletic Organization Commission” 
(“Commission”).243  The Commission’s job, among other things, 
would be to make recommendations to Congress about NIL rules.244  
The proposal also allows schools to prohibit an athlete from entering 
 
238 College Athletes Bill of Rights, S. 2, 116th Cong. § 3(a)(3)(A) (2020). 
239 Id. at § 3(a)(3)(B). 
240 Id. 
241 Senators Booker and Blumenthal Introduce College Athletes Bill of Rights (Dec. 
17, 2020), https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/senators-booker-and-
blumenthal-introduce-college-athletes-bill-of-rights.  
242 College Athletes Bill of Rights, S. 2, 116th Cong. § 6(a)(1)(A-C) (2020). 
243 Student Athlete Level Playing Field Act, S. 2, 116th Cong. § 3(a) (2020). 
244 Id. at § 3(a)(1). 
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into endorsement contracts with: “[any] tobacco company or brand, 
including any vaping device or e-cigarette or related products, any 
alcohol company or brand, any seller or dispensary of a controlled 
substance including marijuana, any adult entertainment business, any 
casino or entity that sponsor or promote gambling activities.”245  The 
committee would also have the power to add any type of company or 
brand that it sees fit to the prohibited list.246  Lastly, this proposal 
seeks to regulate the recruiting process by prohibiting any booster247 
“to directly or indirectly provide or offer to provide any funds or 
thing of value as an inducement for a student athlete to enroll or 
remain at a specific institution or group of institutions.”248 
VII. FINDING THE MIDDLE GROUND 
The state acts and bills discussed above are not nearly as 
comprehensive as is needed to address this issue.  These statutes are a 
start, but do not go far enough.  Similar to the state laws and 
proposals, the NCAA’s interim bylaw changes simply are not 
detailed enough to cover all areas of this complicated issue.  Any 
such changes that fall short of fully allowing athletes from being 
compensated for their NILs will lead to more litigation.  The NCAA 
has correctly identified that it should not be up to a single court to 
overhaul the entirety of a nationwide regulating body.  No decision 
would be able to anticipate all of the issues that would later arise 
from it, due to the fact-intensive nature of governing student-athletes 
from across the nation. 
Thus, the best solution is a standardized federal act.  This act 
would theoretically take away any of the recruiting issues that can 
arise from the lack of uniformity of state acts and remove the power 
 
245 Id. at § 2(a)(2)(A-E). 
246 Id. at § 3(a)(4). 
247 The proposal defines a booster as:  
[I]ndividual (other than an individual who is related to a student 
athlete) or an organization, including a sponsor of an institution’s 
athletic program, that provides substantial financial assistance or 
services to the athletic program of an institution of higher 
education or that promotes a team or athletic program of an 
institution of higher education for such individual’s or 
organization’s own substantial financial interest. 
Id. at § 5(a)(4). 
248 Id. at § 3A. 
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from the NCAA’s hands which have a clear bias in the outcome.  
However, none of the proposed pieces of federal legislation, as they 
currently stand, should be the final answer.  Rather, a hybrid 
approach that combines sections from the various federal proposal 
would be a better outcome.  
 The College Athletes Bill of Rights effectively provides 
college athletes with the ability to capitalize on their NILs, while also 
allowing the schools to limit their options.249  This seemingly results 
in the best of both worlds.  As such, taking from the Student Athlete 
Level Playing Field Act, industries such as alcohol, marijuana, 
gambling and the like should be prohibited outright.250  However, the 
Act should not go as far as allowing athletes to profit share with the 
schools, as this borders on an employee employer relationship.  
Moreover, the athletes should be able to organize together to enable 
them to enter to enter into group NIL deals and make a profit 
collectively in different fields, for example, the lucrative field of 
video games.251  Lastly, as provided in the Student Athlete Level 
Playing Field Act, boosters should be prohibited and there should be 
regulation around incentivizing or attempting to incentivize a recruit 
in attending a school.252  This combined proposal would address the 
needs of a college athlete now.  It would give them the rights that 
they deserve, and the ability to make money that they earn.  All the 
while, colleges, universities, and the NCAA will be able to retain 
some control over the companies that these athletes are eligible to 
profit from, thereby limiting any conflicts of interest and respecting 
the prestige and name of the NCAA and schools alike.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In 2015, Lebron James, the face of the NBA, signed a lifetime 
contract with Nike that “is likely to pay him over $1 billion by the 
time he is 64.”253  These same big name apparel companies are 
 
249 College Athletes Bill of Rights, S. 2, 116th Cong. § 3(a)(3)(A) (2020); see also 
id. at § 3(a)(3)(B).  
250 Student Athlete Level Playing Field Act, S. 2, 116th Cong. § 2(a)(2)(A-E) 
(2020). 
251 Berkowitz, et al., supra note 180. 
252 Student Athlete Level Playing Field Act, S. 2, 116th Cong. § 3A (2020). 
253 Michael Cannivet, Lebron James' Mega-Deal Shows Why Globalization is Here 
to Stay, FORBES (July 17, 2018, 6:41 PM), 
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paying large sums to universities to ensure that the athletes who 
attend their schools are wearing their gear on game day.254  Although 
college athletes do not have the same “stardom” as a player with the 
caliber of Lebron James, there is still a nearly equal amount of money 
at play when they lace up.255   
There have been attempts to make changes through the use of 
the courts, and while they have shown that the NCAA bylaws are 
permeable,256 the outcomes have not been substantial enough.  
Regardless, it should not be left up to one court to determine how a 
national agency regulates its members..257  States have started to 
propose and pass legislation to strike down these archaic NCAA 
bylaws in favor of allowing athletes to have the right to profit from 
their NILs.258  The state actions, compounded with the Supreme 
Court ruling in Alston,259 have forced the hand of the NCAA to adopt 
an interim NIL policy.260  While this is an unprecedented step from 
the NCAA, it is imperative that there is federal resolution of this 
issue, something that the NCAA is directly calling for.261  The best 
action would be to combine the provisions from three of the leading 
proposals. This would give athletes the ability to profit from their 
NILs and other lucrative fields such as the video game industry, 
while also protecting universities and the NCAA from being 
associated with brands or companies that could lead to conflicts of 





254 Wire, supra note 4.  
255 Gibson, supra note 60.  
256 Meyer & Zumbalist, supra note 30, at 274. 
257 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Shawne Alston, et al., 2020 WL 7366281, 5 
(2020) (citing American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 
1249 (3d Cir. 1975)).  
258 Berkowitz et al., supra note 180.  
259 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Alston, 594 U.S., at 36 (2021), 
supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20-512_gfbh.pdf. 
260 Hosick, supra note 12. 
261 Id. (quoting NCAA President Mark Emmert “… we will continue to work with 
Congress to develop a solution that will provide clarity on a national level. The 
current environment – both legal and legislative – prevents us from providing a 
more permanent solution and the level of detail student-athletes deserve.”). 
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